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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Kartchner v. State Tax Commission holds that a 
judgment creditor cannot effect a lien against the property of 
a judgment debtor's grantee. This principle of law precludes 
the Bank from obtaining a judgment lien against the property. 
The undisputed facts show that the Dewsnups quitclaimed the 
property to Lach on November 28, 1980. The Bank docketed its 
judgment against the Dewsnups on December 12, 1980. 
2. The well-established doctrine of equitable con-
version obviates the Bank's attempt to place a lien on the 
property. The judgment debtors and Lach entered into a binding 
earnest money agreement on November 28, 1980. At that point, 
the judgment debtors held only bare legal title to the property 
and thus no interest in the property to which a judgment lien 
could attach. 
3. Respondent mistakenly argues that Appellants are 
precluded from asserting that there is a factual dispute with 
respect to the grant of summary judgment to Respondent. In 
granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment, the lower 
court necessarily relied on facts that were speculative, cer-
tain to be controverted, and went beyond the record in the 
case. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. KARTCHNER V, STATE TAX COMMISSION PROVIDES 
RELIABLE PRECEDENT FOR A DETERMINATION 
IN FAVOR OF APPELLANTS IN THIS CASE 
Utah law is clear. A judgment creditor cannot place a 
lien against property of a judgment debtor's grantee. Kartchner 
v. State Tax Commission of Utah, 4 Utah 2d 382, 294 P.2d 790 
(1956). It may be true that Kartchner presents an abbreviated 
statement of the facts, but the simplicity of Kartchner reflects 
the simplicity of the law with respect to this issue. 
For example, Lund v. Donihue, 674 P.2d 107 (Utah 1983) 
(per curium), which relies on Kartchner for its denial of a 
judgment lien, also involves a simple fact situation. In Lund, a 
judgment creditor attempted to place a judgment lien against the 
property of a husband after the husband conveyed his interest in 
the property to his wife as part of the property division in 
their divorce. The property was deeded to the wife in 1971. The 
judgment creditor obtained a judgment against the husband in 1978 
and docketed that judgment in 1979. The 1971 deed had not been 
recorded. 674 P.2d at 108. The court stated: 
As to [the judgment creditor's] claim of 
nonrecordation of deed from [the judgment 
debtor] incident to the divorce as basis for 
assertion of a lien. . . it is lacking in 
substance. The interest of [the judgment 
debtor] was at best a naked paper title, 
divested in the divorce action and awarded to 
his wife to which [the judgment creditor's] 
claimed lien could not have attached whether 
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the divorce decree, including the order of 
transfer or the deed, was recorded or not. 
Such conclusion is made clear in Kartchner v. 
State Tax Commission which is consonant with 
the statement in Freeman's Treatise on Judg-
ments to the effect that "whenever one holds 
the naked legal title, having no beneficial 
interest, there is nothing to which the 
judgment lien can attach. . . ." 
674 P.2d at 109 (footnotes omitted). Thus, the material facts 
necessary to preclude attachment of a judgment lien to property 
are a conveyance by a judgment debtor to a grantee prior to the 
docketing of a judgment against the judgment debtor. 
The Kartchner and Lund decisions are consistent with 
the doctrine of equitable conversion by which the interest of the 
vendor of real property under an executory sales contract is 
converted to naked legal title. See cases cited in Point II of 
Appellants' brief and below. Whether the prior conveyance is by 
contract or by deed, there is nothing to which a judgment lien 
can attach. 
Respondent expresses concern that the documents refer 
to both Lach Family Partnership and Foothill Properties as the 
buyer of the property. The undisputed facts show that Foothill 
Properties was not a different party in interest than Lach but 
was a "dba" for appellant David Lachr a partner in the Lach Fam-
ily Partnership. The identity of the buyer is not material. 
What is material is that the Dewsnups sold the property and no 
longer had an interest to which a lien could attach. 
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Respondent furthermore provides no basis, factually or 
legally, for its claim that the conveyance to a dba invalidates 
the conveyance. See Barlow Society v, Commercial Security Bankr 
39 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (filed July 31, 1986), in which the plain-
tiff questioned the structure of a transaction whereby a judgment 
debtor conveyed an entire parcel to a grantee merely to facili-
tate financing and to secure an obligation on just the northern 
portion of the land. The court said the nature of the transac-
tion did not invalidate the conveyance: "If valid on its facer 
the presumption is that the deed conveys fee title". See also 
Battistone v. American Land & Development Co., 607 P.2d 837 (Utah 
1980). In the present case, the presumption is that the deed 
conveyed fee title. There is no reason to conclude otherwise. 
The record is before the court. Considering the 
undisputed facts and well-established Utah law, it is clear that 
Lach owns the property free from any judgment lien in favor of 
the Bank* 
II. IN UTAH THE INTEREST OF A VENDOR IN REAL 
PROPERTY SOLD IS NOT SUBJECT TO A JUDGMENT 
LIEN. 
Under the doctrine of equitable conversion, the judg-
ment debtors had no interest in the property to which any judg-
ment lien in favor of the Bank could attach. Respondent mistak-
enly states that Utah cases dealing with equitable conversion 
stand for the proposition that the interest of a vendee in an 
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executory contract cannot be reached by a judgment creditor. 
This is blatantly incorrect. The Utah court has consistently 
held to the contrary; the interest of a vendee can be reached by 
a judgment creditor. See cases cited in Point II of Appellants1 
brief. If the interest of a vendee in an executory contract can 
be reached, a fortiori, the interest of a vendor in real property 
is not subject to a judgment lien. 
Once again, Respondent does not question the lav or the 
undisputed facts of the case. Instead, Respondent, without legal 
or factual support, raises questions about price, possession, and 
conditions. 
As noted under Point II in Appellants' Brief, whether a 
purchaser pays the full purchase price before the judgment is 
docketed is immaterial under the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion. Respondent can cite no cases that point to the existence 
of "partial" equitable conversion arising from partial payment of 
the purchase price. Once a binding agreement is reached and a 
deed is transferred, ownership changes hands regardless of pay-
ment terms. 
Moreover, it is not material to the ownership of the 
property that the vendor retains possession subject to surrender 
at a later date. Illustrative of the point is Utah State Medical 
Ass'n. v. Utah State Employees Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643 (Utah 
1982), where the Utah Supreme Court, relying on the principle of 
equitable ownership, stated that a purchaser is entitled to any 
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benefits that may accrue to the property and must also bear any 
loss or depreciation to the property even when the vendor retains 
possession, 655 P.2d at 644 (emphasis supplied) citing Jelco 
Inc. v, Third Judicial District Court, 29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 
739 (1973). The purchaser, therefore, as the holder of the 
equitable interest in the property, is regarded as the owner of 
the property. Respondent cannot cite a case that suggests that 
whether a lien attaches depends on who is in possession of the 
property. 
Respondent makes much of the fact that an addendum to 
the earnest money agreement states that the contract is subject 
to the parties reaching an agreement as to the solution of the 
problems with drain fields, septic tank and water system. This 
was merely a term of the contract and one that would benefit 
Lach. In Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427 (Utah 1980), the lower 
court granted a buyer specific performance of an earnest money 
agreement despite the seller's protest that a septic tank permit 
had not been obtained as required by the contract. The court 
stated: 
[T]he mere acquisition of a permit, as 
required by the contract, was of no value to 
[the seller]. The failure to obtain a permit 
does not deprive [the seller] of any valuable 
right. The provision was added to the con-
tract by [the buyers], and the condition was 
clearly for their benefit in putting the 
property to its desired use. It was the [the 
buyers] who were entitled to demand the ben-
efit of that condition, and if they chose to 
waive the condition, it was within their 
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power to do so. Ahrendt v. Bobbitt, 119 Utah 
465, 229 P.2d 296 (1951). 
615 P.2d at 430. In the present case, Lach was entitled to 
demand performance of the foregoing provisions. Thus, those 
provisions do not affect the validity of the earnest money 
agreement, which is a legally binding contract for the sale of 
real property. Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597, 
599 (1962). 
Lastly, Respondent provides no factual or legaL support 
for its assertion that Lach held merely an option to purchase the 
real estate in question. Sweezy v. Jones, 65 Iowa 272, 21 N.W. 
603 (1884), does not involve an earnest money agreement. The 
1884 case holds that a judgment creditor cannot maintain an 
action in equity to establish a judgment lien upon land in the 
possession of a judgment debtor under a lease with the right to 
purchase the land. It is not even remotely connected to the 
issue before the Court in the present case. The same is true of 
Viqars v. Hewins, 184 Iowa 683, 169 N.W. 119 (1918). The undis-
puted facts in the present case show that the judgment debtor and 
Lach executed an earnest money agreement, not an option to pur-
chase. 
In short, the necessary elements of equitable conver-
sion undisputedly exist in the case at bar. There being no 
interest on the part of the judgment debtor to which a lien could 
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attach, Lach owns the property free from any judgment lien in 
favor of the Bank. 
III. RESPONDENT CANNOT SHOW THAT IT IS ENTITLED TO 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THE 
UNDISPUTED FACTS. 
There is no factual basis for summary judgment in favor 
of the Bank. Respondent misunderstands Appellants' claim that 
the lower court improperly granted Respondent summary judgment 
because there were disputed issues of material fact with respect 
to Respondent's motion. Respondent states that if Appellants 
claim there were undisputed facts for its motion, then those 
undisputed facts necessarily support Respondent's motion. That 
is obviously not the case. 
In reviewing a summary judgment, the Supreme Court will 
view the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing 
the motion and allow the summary judgment to stand only if the 
movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the 
undisputed facts. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Bushnell Real Estate 
Inc. v. Nielsen, 672 P.2d 746 (Utah 1983). In light of those 
considerations, there is no question that Respondent's motion was 
not supported by undisputed facts. For example, there is no 
evidence in the record that suggests that the transaction was 
fraudulent to creditors. Indeed, just the opposite is true. The 
district court grant of summary judgment to Respondent should 
therefore be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent does not provide any basis, factually or 
legally, for an affirmation of the lower court's decisions below 
and this Court should reverse the lower court and enter summary 
judgment in favor of Appellants. 
DATED this -?7# day of October, 1986. 
JOHN B. WILSON 
LOIS A. BAAR 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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